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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EFFECT OF THE DuE PROCESS CrAusE or THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT UPON THE AD mISsION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED AGAINST THE WILL OF
THE AccusED BY MEANS OF A STOMACH Pump.--Three deputy sheriffs of Los Angeles
County having information that petitioner was selling narcotics in violation of state
law, forced their way into petitioner's room. They found him sitting on the side of
his bed. The deputies saw two capsules on a table near the bed and made inquiry
concerning them. Whereupon petitioner seized the capsules and put them into his
mouth. The officers attempted forcibly to extract them, but petitioner swallowed
them. He was then taken to a hospital where a doctor inserted a tube into his throat
and poured an emetic solution into the tube. This "stomach pumping" produced
vomiting and two capsules of morphine were found in the spewed matter. Petitioner
was tried and convicted of possessing a preparation of morphine in violation of the
California Health and Safety Code. The capsules were admitted into evidence over
petitioner's objection and constituted the chief evidence against him. The District
Court of Appeal of California affirmed and the Supreme Court of that state denied
without opinion the petition for a hearing. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. On appeal, held, judgment reversed. The conviction was obtained by
methods that violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rochin
v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
In Wolf v. Colorado,' the state police had obtained evidence through an illegal
search and seizure and such evidence was used in the state court to convict the
defendant of a state crime. The defendant contended that the admission of such
evidence deprived him of his liberty without due process of law.2 The Supreme Court
speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter reasoned that the right of privacy against
the arbitrary intrusion by police is basic to a free society and protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is thus enforceable against the states through the due
process clause, so that if a state were to "affirmatively sanction" such illegal search
it would violate that clause. However, the court further pointed out that the federal
rule, adopted in Weeks v. United States,3 which would exclude the evidence obtained
through an unreasonable search by federal officers from use in a federal prosecution
was a rule of procedure. It was not an intrinsic part of the Fourth Amendment 4 and,
as such, is not applicable to the state courts. It was held that the admission of the
evidence in the state court is not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. In the
same year United States v. Williss was decided. It is a case closely analogous to the
principal case. There, a federal officer participated in the stomach pumping of the ac-
cused in order to obtain two capsules of heroin which the accused had swallowed. The
United States district court held that the stomach pumping was an unreasonable search
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the evidence so obtained
was, therefore, held to be inadmissible under the federal rule. It is obvious that if
the Court, in the instant case, were to be wholly logical, it would have held that
the stomach pumping of the petitioner was an unreasonable search and seizure, but
1. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
2. ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . " U.S. CovsT. AmND. XV, § 1.
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... ." U.S. Co!.sT. A m.
IV.
5. 85 F. Supp. 745 (D. C. Cal. 1949).
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that the evidence so obtained was admissible in the state court under the rule of the
Wolf case. Here, however, the Court was apparently intent on doing what it had
refused to do in the Wolf case,0 i.e., dissuading wrongful state police action by
excluding the evidence so obtained.
Apparently with this objective in mind, the Court ignored the decision in the Woll
case and based its decision on the coerced confession cases. In these latter cases, 7
the original concept of due process fell within the common law confession rule which
excluded the confession as evidence because of the possibility that it was unworthy
of credibility.8 However, the concept of due process soon outstripped the common
law rule.9 The Supreme Court has held that the use in evidence of a coerced con-
fession violates due process, without regard to the objective verity of the confession. 10
These later cases might have been explained as violating a privilege somewhat like
the privilege against self-incrimination." Although it has been held that the states
are not subject to the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment as to self-incrimination
via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' 2 still there is much language
showing some affinity between the two.' 3 The decision in the instant case seems to
shatter such explanation, however, since here the Court dealt with real evidence and
the self-incrimination privilege has been held to apply only to evidence of a testimonial
nature.14 The rule applied in the instant case, therefore, does not admit of any
specific norm such as might be found in some one of the first ten amendments to
the Constitution. It is a rule born of the due process clause alone. It calls for the
use of "civilized conduct" in state criminal proceedings. In the instant case, the
Court said that due process of law precludes defining; it merely dictates that
6. ". . . the exclusion of evidence is a remedy which directly serves only to protect
those upon whose person or premises something incriminating has been found. We cannot,
therefor, regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand such persons, together
with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of private action and such
protection as the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion,
may afford. Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way
of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling below
the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other
methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective." Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 30-1 (1949).
7. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) was the first case so holding.
8. III WiGmoRE, EvinNEcE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
9. Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62
(1949) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949).
10. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 n. 2 (1949).
11. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... ." U.S. CoNsT. A.rEND. V.
12. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908). This rejected theory was again advanced as the basis for the concurring opinions
of Justices Black and Douglas in the instant case, wherein they said the "stomach pumping"
violated the privilege against self-incrimination and that, per se, constitutes a denial of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
13. "Under our system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the
accused not out of his own mouth. It must establish its case, not by interrogation of the
accused even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through
skillful investigation. 'The law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the deluded Instru-
ment of his own conviction.'" Watts v. India~na, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.).
14. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252 (1910).
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"convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice.' 125
It has been said to guarantee respect for those personal immunities which are "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, '10
or are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' 71
In the instant case, the Court thought the methods used to procure the evidence
were "... . too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differen-
tiation."'I s This analogy appears far fetched since the distinction between torturing
a person's body until his pain-wracked mind forces words of confession from his lips,
and in using forceful methods in order to produce two pills, appears to be obvious.
In the former, the result is unworthy of belief: in the latter, there can be no
question of credibility. However, the Court in the instant case has applied the rule
as it was adopted in the coerced confession cases, i.e., if the means used to obtain
evidence shock the conscience,19 then the use of such evidence to convict the accused
constitutes a denial of due process, regardless of the question of unworthiness of the
evidence. The very statement of the principle points out the great difficulty that will
mark its application. As previously held in the coerced confession cases, the use of
coercion alone in extracting a confession violates this rule of "civilized conduct."
However in the instant case the Court condemns the whole course of proceedings, i.e.,
the combination of wrongs used. The illegal breaking into petitioner's privacy is an
unreasonable search, and standing alone, would apparently not cause exclusion of the
evidence obtained, under the rule of the Wolf case. The attempt to open petitioners
mouth was probably brutal, but it alone did not cause the production of the evidence.
There is no relation between this force used and the conviction. The stomach pump-
ing was the producing cause of the evidence and hence of the conviction. In order
to exclude the evidence the Court looked at the combination of methods used and
found that, together, they constituted a violation of the "civilized conduct" rule, as
laid down in the coerced confession cases, and therefore deprived defendant of due
process of law. It is difficult to generalize on what the Court would consider "un-
civilized conduct" in future cases, where real evidence is being dealt with. Even in
the instant case, the Court felt constrained to except from the effect of its decision
certain state decisions2° wherein "modem methods and devices for discovering wrong-
doers" 2' were used. It is very possible that if the stomach pumping had been the
only factor involved, the instant decision might have been different.
The methods employed to obtained the evidence in the principal case did not
shock the consciences of the lower court judges so as to cause them to exclude the
evidence. The Supreme Court said that "this course of proceeding by agents of
government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities."2 2
15. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). See also Davidson v. NeMw Orleans,
96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877) where the Court said the phrase is to be developed "by the gradual
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall
require . .. Y
16. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
17. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See also Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
18. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 172 (1952).
19. Ibid.
20. See, e.g., Skidmore v. State, 59 Nev. 320, 92 P. 2d 979 (1939) (examination of
accused for venereal disease) ; State v. Sturtevant, 96 N. H. 99, 70 A. 2d 909 (1950) (blood
test to determine intoxication).
21. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
22. Id. at 172.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Yet, the result whereby this defendant was enabled successfully to avoid conviction
by swallowing evidence in the very presence of the police may be offensive to some
sensibilities also. Unquestionably the Court's purpose-to discourage state police
from the use of wrongful means in obtaining evidence-is a laudable one and it must
be admitted that the exclusion of such evidence will prove to be a most effective
means of attaining that purpose. However, it must be kept in mind that in cases
such as the instant case, a proven criminal is allowed to thwart justice in order to
punish the erring state police.23 It is the guilty who directly benefit from such. a
rule.2A Much difficulty will be encountered in the future in deciding just what number
and nature of wrongs will, when combined to obtain evidence in a given case, con-
stitute a breach of "civilized conduct." A rule susceptible of such varied application
could dangerously encroach upon, and if extensively broadened could well-nigh cripple,
our system of state criminal jurisprudence.25 It would therefore seem that this rule
should receive only studious and stringent application. If other remedies (e.g., civil
and criminal redress against wrongful police action and the right to take corrective
action through the ballot box) can effectively protect our individual rights, they should
be preferred.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-STATE STATUTE OF LImI-
TATIONS APPLIES TO ACTION IN FEDERAL COURT BY REORGANIZATION TRUS-
TEE BROUGHT PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY AcT.-Plaintiffs were appointed
trustees of the debtor, a Virginia corporation, which had filed a peti-
tion for reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act in
the District Court of Virginia. The trustees brought suit in the District Court
for the Southern District of New York charging that the defendant, the principal
stockholder of the debtor, and others breached a fiduciary duty in that they over-
reached the debtor in several transactions. The defendant contended that the
claims were barred under the New York statute of limitations as interpreted by
New York courts. The district court, relying on the fact that jurisdiction was not
based on diversity of citizenship but upon the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act,
ruled that it was not required to apply the state statute as would the New York
courts and held the suit not barred. On appeal, one judge dissenting, held, re-
versed, on the ground that the Bankruptcy Act requires federal courts to apply
the state statute of limitations as interpreted by the state courts. Austrian v. Wil.
liams, 198 F. 2d 697 (2nd Cir. 1952).
The Supreme Court in Williams v. Austrian' held that Section 2(a)(7) of the
Bankruptcy Act 2 conferred upon the district courts jurisdiction to hear plenary
23. See 42 MicH. L. Rlv. 679 (1944).
24. See note 6 supra.
25. "But, whenever a new limitation or restriction is declared, it is a matter of grave
import, since to that extent, it diminishes the authority of the State, so necessary to the
perpetuity of our dual form of government, and changes its relation to its people and to
the Union." Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 92 (1908).
1. 331 U. S. 642 (1947).
2. 52 STAT. 842, 11 U.S.C. 11(a)(7) (1938) gives "The courts of the United States
.. . such jurisdiction . . . in proceedings under this title . . . to . . . cause the estates of
bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money and distributed and determine controversies
in relation thereto, except as herein otherwise provided. . ....
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suits brought by a reorganization trustee; diversity of citizenship is not necessary.
An action, such as the one in the instant case, has been described as one in
equity for an accounting based on a charge that the affairs of a state-created
corporation were conducted in violation of state law.3  Section 11(e) of the
Bankruptcy Act permits a trustee to institute such an action when it is not barred
by an applicable federal or state statute of limitations.4
The issue in the instant case is whether under the Bankruptcy Act a federal
court must apply the state statute of limitations without regard to the equitable
principle that is applied to federal statutes of limitation. Under the New York
statute the claims of the trustees would be barred before the date of adjudication
even though the facts giving rise to the causes of action were fraudulently con-
cealed. -5 However, under federal law the statutory period would not begin to run
until the injured party had become aware of the wrong done.0
Prior to the decision in Erie R. R. v. Tompkin 7 federal courts, where diversity
of citizenship was the basis of jurisdiction, were only bound to apply the statutory
law of the states.8 The Erie case held that where diversity of citizenship juris-
diction existed a federal court was in effect another state court. In Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York this rule was held applicable to equity actions. The Court expressly
reserved the question of the applicable law where a federal court is called upon
to decide a claim based on federal law.
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case should be governed by the
Erie R. R.-Tompkins rule. The substantive rights and obligations involved are
not created by any provision of the Bankruptcy Act but by principles of state law,
common or statutory. No bankruptcy controversy is involved. The federal juris-
diction of these causes of action flows from Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act which
grants jurisdiction to a federal court over state-created rights when bankruptcy
occurs. This is analogous to Section 41(1) of the Federal Judiciary Law which
gives a similar grant of jurisdiction where diversity of citizenship exists. While
these federal statutes afford jurisdiction to the federal courts they do not create
3. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582 (1949).
Mr. Jusice Jackson, commenting on Williams v. Austrian, said that "The only way In
which any law of the United States contributed to the case was in opening the district
courts to the trustee." Supra note 1, at 599.
4. 52 STAT. 849, 11 U. S. C. 29(e) (1938) provides in part: "A receiver or trustee may,
within two years subsequent to the date of adjudication or within such further period of
time as the Federal or State law may permit, institute proceedings in behalf of the estate
upon any claim which the period of limitation fixed by Federal or State law had not
expired at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. . . ." Adjudication is
dated by relation back to the time of filing the petition. 52 STAT. 883, 11 U. S. C. 502
(1938). In the principal case the petition was filed February 23, 1942 and the action was
brought in 1945.
5. Zwerdling v. Bent, 264 App. Div. 195, 35 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1st Dept. 1942), afl'd
without opinion, 291 N.Y. 654, 51 N.E.2d 933 (1943).
6. Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342 (U. S. 1874).
7. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
S. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842), where it was held that Section 34 of the
Federal Judiciary Act required federal courts to apply the statutory law of a state where
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction existed. The federal courts, however, were not bound
by the common law of a state but could refer to the "general common law.,
9. 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
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federal substantive rights. Following the analogy to its logical end, the conclu-
sion is that in both cases the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins should govern the
substantive law to be applied.'0
Any other rule leads to an incongruous result. If prior to bankruptcy the
debtor corporation, or its stockholders suing derivatively, had brought this action,
state law would have determined the timeliness of the action. This would be so
whether the action had been brought in a state court or in a federal court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship. Inasmuch as the reorganization trustee in this
action inherited the claims of the debtor" it follows that if the claims were barred
by state law prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy, the trustee has inherited a
barred claim. In Harrigan v. Bergdoll'2 the trustee sued a stockholder of the
debtor corporation for the unpaid amount of stock held by the stockholder. The
defendant pleaded the state statute of limitations. It was held that the Bankruptcy
Act was not intended to revive causes of action nor create new ones; that the
trustee took only what the bankrupt had prior to bankruptcy.
Actions barred by state law before the adjudication were held barred to the
trustee under the precursor sections of Section 11(e) in the cases decided under
the Bankruptcy Acts of 1867 and 1898. Section 2 of the Act of 186713 defined
the time within which a trustee in bankruptcy must bring his action. Freelander
v. Hollornan14 construed Section 2 as defining a limitary period separate from
that provided by state law. The effect of the holding was that if the state statute
had not run prior to the appointment of the assignee in bankruptcy then Section 2
superseded the state statute. However, implicit in the decision is the rule that
if the state statute barred the action before the assignee's appointment then Sec-
tion 2 was inoperative to extend the time within which the trustee could bring
his action.1 Bailey v. Glover"' also decided under the Act of 1867, held
that the federal limitation contained in Section 2 would be extended where the
facts giving rise to the cause of action were fraudulently concealed. While the
decision in that case does not indicate how long prior to the appointment of the
trustee the transaction occurred, it appears that the state statute of limitations
10. In a concurring opinion in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., 315 U.S. 477, 470 (1942), Mr. Justice Jackson, commenting on the Eric case,
stated that to him the decision meant "that federal courts may not apply their own notions
of the common law at variance with applicable state decisions except where the Constitu-
tion, treaties, or laws of the United States so require or provide." That the instant case
is not within the exception stated see supra note 3.
11. 44 STAT. 667, 11 U. S. C. 110 (1938).
12. 270 U. S. 560 (1926). In Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green,
329 U. S. 156, 170 (1946), the Court said, "that except where federal law, wholly apart
from Bankruptcy, has created obligations by the exercise of power granted to the federal
government, a claim implies the existence of an obligation created by State law .... "
13. 14 STAT. 518 (1867) provided in substance that no suit could be maintained by or
against the trustee unless brought within two years of adjudication and that the adjudica-
tion did not revive suits already barred.
14. 9 Fed. Cas. 748, No. 5081 (D. C. Miss. 1873).
15. In West Portland Homestead Ass'n v. Lownsdale, 17 Fed. 205 (D. C. Ore. 1883),
the court held that the provision in Section 2, that the adjudication did not revive the
cause of action, was not applicable and noted that state law had not barred the action at
the date of the trustee's appointment.
16. 21 Wall. 342 (U. S. 1874).
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had not run. The Bailey decision, therefore, did not alter the rule: the cause
of action being barred by the state statute of limitations before adjudication it is
forever barred to the trustee.
In the instant case, the dissenting opinion favored the application of the rule
of the Bailey case. The dissent, however, failed to note that that case involved a
federal statute of limitations whereas the principal case involves a state statute.17
The statute of limitations in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided that suits
by or against the trustee were barred two years after the estate was closed.18 The
courts varied in their application of this limitation depending upon whether the
cause of action was created by state law or arose under the Bankruptcy Act. In
Davis v. Wiley,19 the action alleged a fraudulent transfer by the bankrupt to the
defendant. The issue was whether the statute of limitations to be applied was
the one contained in the Bankruptcy Act or the one provided by the California
Code. The court ruled that the state statute controlled. The rationale was that
inasmuch as the cause of action arose under state law the trustee acquired no
greater rights than a creditor would have had under state law. Mci.le v. Drain
et al.,20 also a trustee's action, involved a preferential transfer made vithin four
months of the filing of the petition. The cause of action was predicated on Section
60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act which permits the trustee to avoid such transfers
and to recover the property. It was held that because the cause of action was given
by the Bankruptcy Act and based thereon, the applicable statute of limitations
was the one contained in the Bankruptcy Act.2 1
Confusion existed under the Act of 1898 as to whether state law could extend
the limitary period provided for in this Act or whether this provision could serve
to diminish the time allowed by state law.2 2 In both Acts, however, there existed
the uniform rule that where the action was barred by state law before the petition
was filed, the filing could not revive the cause of action for the trustee. It is
submitted that the provision of Section 11(e), that the action may be brought
"ithin such further period of time as the Federal or State law may permit," was
merely to avoid the confusion present under the Act of 1898. Therefore, Section
11(e) may properly be construed as its precursor sections were.
The dissenting opinion, in the instant case, expressed the fear that the appli-
cation of state law would disrupt Congress's intention of uniformity in the laws
relating to the estates of bankrupts. It is submitted that the uniformity sought
by Congress refers to rights which exist under state law at the date of adjudication;
that if by the law of the state creating the right it is barred at the date of adjudica-
tion, there is nothing to be uniformly administered.2
17. There is no decision which has applied the rule of the Bailey case to a state statute
of limitations where the rights were state-created. Cf. Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U. S.
392 (1946).
1s. 52 STAT. S49, 11 U. S. C. 29(d) (1938).
19. 273 Fed. 297 (9th Cir. 1921). This case was criticized in Isaacs v. Newton et al.,
75 F. 2d 566 (5th Cir. 1935), holding that the limitation applies to all causes of action
brought by a trustee provided they were not barred by state law before the petition was
filed.
20. 69 F. 2d 290 (9th Cir. 1934).
21. See also Fuller v. Rock, 125 Ohio 36, 180 N. E. 367 (1932), where the Supreme
Court of Ohio held that if the state statute of limitations had run at the time the petition
was filed, the limitation provided in the Bankruptcy Act could have no force.
22. Nairn v. McCarthy, 120 F. 2d 910 (7th Cir. 1941).
23. In Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U. S. 156 (1946),
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The decision in the instant case has, and it is submitted with logical and historical
accuracy, extended the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins to cover proceedings under
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. There is left untrammeled the basic principle
of uniformity as understood in the Act; a uniformity which is not a sameness of
principle but a uniformity of application of diverse state laws.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-DAMAGEs-Loss OF EARNINGS AND MEDICAL EXPENSES
INCLUDED IN AWARD THOUGH PAID BY EMPLOYER-DETERMINED BY LAW OF PLACE
or EMPLoYMENT.-Plaintiff, employed in New Jersey, was struck by a United States
Post Office Department truck while in New York on business. After trial, judgment
was entered for plaintiff based on defendant's negligence. Damages were awarded
which included loss of earnings and hospital and medical expenses, although these
items had been paid by plaintiff's employer. On appeal, one judge dissenting, held,
affirmed. Under New Jersey law this payment by plaintiff's employer could not be
set up in mitigation of damages. Landon v. United States, 197 F. 2d 128 (2d Cir.
1952).
B'efore determining whether the loss of wages and medical and hospital expenses
may be included in an award of damages when they have in fact been paid for by a
third party, it is necessary to ascertain whether the law of New Jersey, where plaintiff
was employed, or the law of New York, where he was injured, will apply. This action
was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act,' which statute applies the standards
and tests of the state where the accident occurred on questions of negligence and the
nature and extent of recovery. 2 This accident having occurred in New York, the
law of New York would thus be applicable.
The court in the instant case however held that by virtue of the New Jersey
employment contract the law of New Jersey was applicable on the question of
damages, since New York will follow the law of the place of performance of the
contract. That this is then a true statement of the New York rule in relation to
damages for breach of contracts as well as the general rule relating thereto4 may
not be denied. However on the basis of this rule of damages governing contract
cases the court proceeded to apply the New Jersey law as to the measure of damages
in a tort action. It is with this conclusion that the dissenting opinion takes issue
arguing, and it is submitted correctly, that the present action sounds in tort and that
the contract element is of doubtful relevancy. It is further argued that the measure
of damages allowed in this action must be controlled by the New York decisions.
The general rule of conflict of laws in tort cases is that the place of the tort is
the place where the injured party was situated at the time of the wrong,5 and the
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion appropriately noted that the establishing
of uniform laws of bankruptcy did not encompass disregarding the differences among the
laws of the forty-eight states.
1. 61 STAT. 101, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1949).
2. Olson v. United States, 175 F. 2d 510 (8th Cir. 1949).
3. Swift & Co. v. Bankers' Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E. 2d 992 (1939);
Hibernia National Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N.Y. 367 (1881).
4. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT or LAWS § 413 (1934).
S. RESTATEMENT, CormcT OF LAWs § 377 (1934); see also Otey v. Midland Valley
R. Co., 108 Kan. 755, 197 Pac. 203 (1921); Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine
Central R.R., 78 N.H. 553, 103 AtI. 263 (1918). See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377,2,
378.2, 379.1, 412.2 (1935).
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law of the place of the wrong determines the liability of the alleged tortfeasorc and
likewise appears to govern the measure of damages.7 It would thus seem that the
New York rule of damages in tort matters would dearly control the plaintiff's
recovery in the instant case.
The New York law of damages as regards the effect of an employer's payments
to an employee upon the question of recovery from a third party tortfeasor was
set forth in Drinkwater v. Dinsnore.8 That case held that where by the terms of
an employment contract an employee's wages are paid by the employer during his
disability such wages are not thereafter recoverable by the employee in a suit against
a third party tortfeasor. Unpopular though this doctrine may be,9 and though it is
repudiated by most jurisdictions,10 it has nonetheless been reaffirmed as the law of
New York.-"
The later New York cases have placed serious limitations upon the Drn1 watcr
holding. Thus if the employer could compel the employee to repay the funds given
during disability in the event of a recovery against a third party the rule would not
apply.' 2 Similarly if the funds paid are insurance money the New York courts would
allow the employee to recover the amount so paid from the third party. The Drink-
water rule is by its very terms inapplicable.13 Whether or not the employee could
be so compelled and whether the payments were insurance moneys would depend
upon the law of New Jersey, the place of performance of the contract,14 and to that
extent the New Jersey contract becomes instantly relevant. However in the present
state of the record it is not clear that the money constituted insurance funds or wages,
and if wages whether reimbursement could be compelled. The suggestion of the
dissenting judge that further testimony concerning the arrangement under which the
employee's wages were paid, and that a finding of fact be made thereon appears
meritorious.
It would seem that the court sought to use the employment contract as a means of
avoiding the Drinkwater decision. New Jersey is unhampered by the rule of that
case.15 In an endeavor to reach what it deemed a just result, the court appears to
have confused the law.
6. Fitzpatrick v. International Ry. Co., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929) (where
the court applied the comparative negligence rule of Ontario, the law of the place of the
wrong). But see Dyke v. Erie Ry. Co., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871) which was recently rejected
as being inconsistent with later decisions. Maynard v. Eastern Air Lines, 178 F. 2d 139
(2d Cir. 1949).
7. Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F. 2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949). "The measure of
damages for a tort is determined by the law of the place of the wrong." zsrArmrmr,
Corcr or LAws § 412 (1934).
8. 80 N.Y. 390 (1880).
9. 2 Smowicx, DAAGES § 483 (9th ed. 1920).
10. See McCoPasAcK, DA AGEs §§ 87 n. 2, 90 n. 12 (1935) and cases therein cited.
11. Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co. v. Childs, 253 N.Y. 324, 171
N.E. 391 (1930); Clarke v. Eighth Ave. R.R. Co., 238 N.Y. 246, 144 N.E. 516 (1924).
12. Drake v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp, 162 Misc. 167, 294 N.Y. Supp.
227 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
13. "Proof of the insurance actually paid would not tend to show that the damage
claimed was not actually occasioned by the wrongdoer; but ... that compensation had
been received ...from some other source." Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390, 392
(1880).
14. REsTATEXE.T, Co -cr or LAws § 413 (1934).
15. Weher v. Morris & Essex R.R. Co., 36 N.J.L. 213 (1873).
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CRIMINAL LAw-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-ACQUITTAL Or RECKLESS DRIVING AS FRECLUD-
ING INDICTMENT FOR DEATH RESULTING THEREFRO M.-Defendant was indicted for
causing the death of another while driving an automobile in a reckless manner.
Defendant had been involved in a fatal accident and had been tried and acquitted of
the charge of reckless driving. To the instant indictment there was interposed a
plea of autrefois acquit which the prosecutor moved to dismiss. The trial court
granted the motion and dismissed the plea. Upon appeal, held, one judge dissenting,
dismissal of plea affirmed. The defendant had not been placed in double jeopardy.
State v. Shoopman, 20 N.J. Super. 354, 90 A.2d 43 (1952).
The problem presented for the appellate court was whether the acquittal of the
charge of reckless driving presented a bar to the prosecution for death resulting
from the same occurrence. That no person shall twice be tried for the same offense
is a prohibition of the common law' incorporated into the Federal Constitution,2
as well as into the constitutions of New Jersey3 and the majority of the states.4
Difficulty arises in determining when the two offenses !ire the same within the
meaning of the prohibition. Most jurisdictions settle the issue by a comparison of
the evidence necessary to sustain the different charges.5 Courts have differed in
application of this "same evidence" test. In its strictest form it requires that exactly
the same evidence be necessary for conviction under each charge.0 When proof of
a fact in one prosecution is not necessary for conviction in the other the subsequent
prosecution does not place defendant in double jeopardy. A more liberal test
sometimes applied prescribes that if the evidence necessary under one offense would
necessarily prove the other, the first prosecution precludes the second.7 In a few
jurisdictions the situation, not the evidence, furnishes the criterion. This "same
transaction" test8 prohibits splitting one criminal transaction into different phases
or aspects.9 For example, it has been held that a charge of a conspiracy to commit
larceny and escape by automobile necessarily included a separate charge of conspiracy
to commit larceny and that conviction of the former barred any subsequent action
on the latter.'0 If one act is the basis for two statutory offenses, the state may
prosecute only one," and if the lesser offense is included in the greater a determina-
1. Commonwealth v. Jones, 288 Mass. 150, 192 N.E. 522 (1934); State v. DiGlosla,
3 N.J. 413, 70 A. 2d 756 (1950).
2. ". . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." U.S. CoNsr. AMEND. V.
3. "No person shall after acquittal, be tried for the same offense .... " N.J. CONST.
Art. 1, § 10.
4. See People v. Savarese, 114 N.Y. S. 2d 816 (Kings County Ct. 1952); RovTsc11AXEPRl,
HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CoNsvTrroNAL LAW 812, 817 (1939); 1 BisnoP, CRrMINAL LAw
§ 981 (1923).
5. Spears v. People, 220 Ill. 72, 77 N.E. 112 (1906) ; Medlock v. Commonwealth, 216
Ky. 718, 288 S.W. 670 (1926) ; Comment, 40 YALE L. J. 462 (1931).
6. A reckless driving conviction did not bar a manslaughter prosecution because evidence
of death was not necessary under both charges. People v. Herbert, 6 Cal. 2d 541, 58 P.
2d 909 (1936).
7. A conviction for transporting liquor barred a subsequent prosecution for transporting
liquor in an automobile. Arrol v. State, 207 Ind. 321, 192 N.E. 440 (1934).
8. See Harris v. Georgia, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S. E. 2d 573 (1941) ; Note, 7 BROo1XLYN L.
REv. 79, 83 (1937).
9. Murray v. Stafe, 52 Okla. Cr. 1, 2 P. 2d 287 (1931).
10. Steffler et al. v. State, 104 N.E. 2d 729 (Ind. 1952).
11. Haraway v. State, 22 Ala. App. 552, 117 So. 612 (1928). If an act violates both a
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tion of either bars a prosecution of the other.'2 In New York the "same evidence"
test is applied. An act may be an offense against two statutes, and, if each requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal under either statute
does not bar a subsequent prosecution under the other.-
Closely allied to the principle of double jeopardy is the doctrine of res judicata.
This doctrine, long familiar to civil litigation, is also applicable to criminal cases.24
Res judicata and double jeopardy are mutually inclusive in some instances, mutually
exclusive in others.- If the exact offense is charged again in a second prosecution
both principles are applicable. If the second prosecution is not for the same offense,
res judicata alone is applicable. In such a situation the plea of res judicata acts
as a solemn estoppel to prevent the further litigation of the decided issues between
the same parties. In Harris v. State of Georgia'- the court held that where defendant
had been acquitted of murder the state could not then prosecute for a robbery
arising out of the same transaction since the jury in the prior prosecution had found
that defendant did not participate in the murderous transaction.
In the instant case a motor vehicle violation was pleaded as a former jeopardy.
Generally such violations are not considered a bar to subsequent manslaughter
charges.' 7
Originally, New Jersey was consistent in applying the "same transaction" test.
Thus, in the leading case of State v. Cooper, 8 a conviction of arson barred a
prosecution for the murder of a person burned to death in the same fire. A plea of
guilty to robbery prevented prosecution for a murder committed in the course of the
robbery.-9 A motorist who struck two persons in an accident, killing one of them, was
acquitted of manslaughter and successfully pleaded former jeopardy to an indictment
for assault on the survivor20 In later cases, the "same evidence" test, applied in
federal and a state statute, the prohibition does not apply. Herbert et al. v. La., 272 U.S.
312 (1926); United States v. Lanza et al., 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
12. Steffier et al. v. State, 104 N.E. 2d 729 (Ind. 1952); Commonwealth v. Thatcher,
364 Pa. 326, 71 A. 2d 796 (1950). This 'same transaction" test, however, has been
expressly rejected in some jurisdictions. State v. Thompson, 241 Iowa 16, 39 N.E. 2d
637 (1949); People v. Pearson, 120 Mfisc. 377, 199 N.Y. Supp. 488 (Na.au County Ct.
1923).
13. People v. Skarczewski, 178 'isc. 160, 33 N.Y. S. 2d 299 (Mlonroe County Ct. 1941),
affd, 287 N.Y. 826, 41 N.E. 2d 99 (1942); People v. Lavopa, 198 Misc. 285, 101 N.Y. S.
2d 740 (Bronx County Ct. 1950); People ex reL. Kwiatkowslk v. Trenkle, 169 Misc. 687,
9 N.Y. S. 2d 661 (Cattaraugus County Ct. 1938).
14. United States v. Oppenheimer et al., 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
15. Note, 25 VA. L. Ray. 839 (1939).
16. 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E. 2d 573 (1941).
17. State v. Bacom, 159 Fla. 54, 30 So. 2d 744 (1947); People v. Herbert, 6 Cal. 2d
541, 58 P. 2d 909 (1936) (a conviction of recdess driving will not bar a subsequent man-
slaughter prosecution); Commonwealth v. Jones, 288 Mass. 150, 192 N.E. 522 (1934)
(nor will an acquittal). The decision in State v. Empey, 65 Utah 609, 239 Pac. 25 (1925),
holding that a drunken driving conviction does not act as a bar to a manslaughter charge,
is apparently based on the fact that there is a difference in the definition of the offenses,
that is, they are "different offense-s related not by definition but only by concurrence in
time and space, and the situation here is not one in which the double jeopardy rule applies.'
Campbell v. State, 215 Ark. 785, 223 S.W. 2d 505 (1949).
18. 13 N.J. L. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1833).
19. State v. Mowser, 92 N.J. L. 474, 106 AtL 416 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919).
20. State v. Cosgrove, 103 N.J. L. 412, 135 Atl. 871 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927).
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the instant case, was sanctioned.21
In the principal case, the court held there were two distinct offenses: one against
the Motor Vehicle Act 2 2 and the other against the Crimes Act. 23 Although the
language of the two statutes is substantially the same, the former is intended to
punish reckless driving, while the latter is directed against the effects of such driving.
The first is complete without a resulting death.24 Applying the "same evidence"
test, the court held that proof of death is necessary for the second charge but not
for the first, and therefore the offenses are not identical. The dissent, citing the
Cooper,25 Mowser20 and Cosgrove27 cases, argued that the same act was the basis
for the two charges, and that the evidence necessary to sustain the second indictment
would have been sufficient for a conviction under the first. Applying the principle
of res judicata the dissenting opinion argues, and it is submitted correctly, that the
acquittal of the reckless driving charge negatives conclusively the charge of reckless
driving and defendant cannot be guilty of causing death while driving recklessly.
The majority of the court referred to this more liberal test but failed to apply it.
Nor did the court advert to the" applicability of the rule of res judicata. It is
submitted that the acquittal of the reckless driving charge is a final adjudication of
a fact necessary to sustain a conviction under the instant indictment. Logically, a
person cannot kill by an act of reckless driving which he did not commit.2 Such
a procedure circumvents the protection intended by the double jeopardy principle.20
The court strictly applied the "same evidence" test requiring identical proof of
each offense to sustain a plea of double jeopardy. The plea of former jeopardy.
could have been upheld as was suggested in the dissenting opinion, under the courts'
former decisions applying the "same transaction" test.30 It is submitted that the
21. State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A. 2d 617 (1951).
22. "A person who drives a vehicle on a highway carelessly and heedlessly, in willful
or wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others, or without due caution and circum-
spection, and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a
person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving .... " N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-96
(1928).
23. "Any person who shall cause the death of another by driving any vehicle carelessly
and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of the rights of safety of others shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:138-9 (1935).
24. People v. Herbert, 6 Cal. 2d 541, 58P. 2d 909 (1936) ; State v. Empey, 65 Utah
609, 239 Pac. 25 (1925).
25. State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1833).
26. State v. Mowser, 92 N.J. L. 474, 106 AtI. 416 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919).
27. State v. Cosgrove, 103 N.J.L. 412, 135 Atl. 871 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927).
28. It might be argued that the mens rea is different for the two violations, that the
offense merely requires proof of an intent to disregard the rights of others to be free from
harm to the person (less than death) or to property, whereas the crime requires proof of an
intent to disregard a particular right, the right to life. Actually this is not so. The latter
type of intent may be required for a conviction under the true manslaughter statutes.
People v. Angelo, 246 N.Y. 451, 159 N.E. 394 (1927). However the crime here involved
is not really one of manslaughter although often designated as such. It is essentially the
offense of reckless driving aggravated by the fact of death and was created by the legisla-
tures due to the unwillingness of juries to convict in such cases for manslaughter. People
v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 212 N.W. 97 (1927); Rex v. Preusantanz, 2 D.L.R. 421, 65
Can. Crim. Cas. 129 (1936).
29. Smith et al. v. State, 41 N.J. L. 598, 616 (Ct. Err. & App. 1879).
30. State v. Cosgrove, 103 N.J.L. 412, 135 At. 871 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927); State v.
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reasoning of the court in applying the "same evidence" test is at least questionable,
and that it erred in not applying the doctrine of res judicata.
TAXATION-INCOmE TAx-TE FOR REPORTING DECEASED PARTNER'S DISTRmuTV
SHA OF PARTNERS=IP I wo .- On the date of his death, November 22, 1945,
decedent was a member of a firm made up of three partners. Decedent filed income
tax returns on a calendar year basis and the partnership filed information returns
on the basis of fiscal years ending June 30. The partnership agreement provided
that upon the death of a partner the personal representatives or the legatees of the
partnership interest of the deceased partner could elect within sixty days to continue
as a partner in the place of the deceased partner or sell his interest as provided
therein. The executor of decedent's estate, on January 2, 1946, attempted to exercise
the right of election to continue as a partner. This election was rejected by the
surviving partners who then reached an agreement with the executor that the partner-
ship be dissolved as of January 31, 1946, and the executor sell decedent's interest to
the surviving partners. The executor filed an income tax return for the decedent for
the period between January 1, 1945, to the date of his death, November 22, 1945,
but included the decedent's share in the partnership income only for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1945. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency
by including the decedents share in the partnership income from the end of the
fiscal year in 1945 to the date of his death. The Tax Court held this inclusion to
be erroneous. On appeal, hteld, one judge dissenting, judgment reversed. The partner-
ship was dissolved on date of deceased partner's death and decedent's final return
was required to include the decedents share in the partnership income to the date
of death. Commissioter v. Waldnman's Estate, 196 F. 2d 83 (2d Cir. 1952).
An individual partner is taxed upon his distributive share of the profits of a
partnership whether or not it is distributed to him.' If the taxable year of the
partner is different from that of the partnership, the partner reports each year his
distributive share of the profits of the partnership for the taxable year of the partner-
ship that ends within or with the taxable year of the partner.; If a partner dies,
his taxable year for his final return ends on the date of his death. Where, as in the
instant case, the firm, by agreement continues after the death of the partner, the
problem is presented as to whether decedent's share of partnership income from the
end of the partnership fiscal year to the date of death is includible in his final return
or is includible in the subsequent return of his estate under Section 126(a)(1) of
the Internal Revenue Code.3
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1934,4 as a result of the United States Court of Claims
decision in Niclwls v. United StatesG any income received by his estate after the
Alowser, 92 N.J. L. 474, 106 At!. 416 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919); State v. Cooper, 13 N.J. L.
361 (Sup. Ct. 1833).
1. INT. Rxv. CODE § 182.
2. INT. Rxv. CODE § 188.
3. .Ir. R v. CODE § 126(a) (1) provides that: "The amount of all items of gross income
in respect of a decedent which are not properly includible in respect of the taxable period
in which falls the date of his death or a prior period, shall be included in the gross income,
for the taxable year when received, of: (A) the estate of the decedent, if the right to
receive the amount is acquired by the decedent's estate from the decedent; ....
4. 48 STAT. 683 (1934).
5. 64 Ct. Cl. 241, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 584 (1927).
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death of a cash basis decedent for services rendered by the decedent prior to his death
was not subject to estate income tax where it was included in his gross estate for
estate tax purposes. Therefore, in order to prevent this income from escaping income
taxation altogether,0 the courts in most of the earlier cases 7 took the position that
death dissolved a partnership, and the decedent's share of partnership income earned
to the date of his death was taxable in his final return. They held that effective
upon the date of death of the partner, the old partnership was dissolved and a new
partnership was formed of the surviving partners, with or without the decedent's
estate as a new partner.
Under the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act, dissolution does not terminate
a partnership but it continues for the purpose of the winding up of its affairs.8 In
Heinor v. Mellon,9 a member of a Pennsylvania partnership died. There were no
provisions in the partnership articles governing continuation of the partnership upon
death of the partner. The Court pointed out that under the Pennsylvania Partnership
Act, the partnership was dissolved but not terminated until the winding up of its
affairs was completed. It then held that although the partnership was dissolved
during the year, the continuing partners were required to report income taxes on
their distributive shares of partnership net profits in the usual manner. Following
the Supreme Court decision in that case, the Tax Court' 0 has similarly held that
as to the surviving members of the partnership there is no termination.
Often-times the partnership agreement contains a provision that the partnership
shall continue despite the death of a partner. Prior to the decision in the instant
case, the courts have usually held these agreements effective for income tax purposes."
The circuit court in one case, found such an agreement valid when it was recognized
by state law, although it noted that the continuance of the partnership following a
change in the composition of its members could only be a legal fiction.' 2 In upholding
similar agreements, the Tax Court has relied upon the specific provisions of state
law in one case,' 3 and in another case upon "general law.'
14
The court in the principal case relies on Guaranty Truest Co. v. Commissionter,25
as the basis for reversing the Tax Court. The Guaranty case involved a partnership
6. See Rabkin & Johnson, The Partnership Under the Federal Tax Laws, 55 HAIv.
L. Rv. 909, 935 (1942).
7. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 493 (1937) (taxable year in question
was 1933) ; People's Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 139 (Ct. Cl. 1935);
Clarence B. Davison, 20 B.T.A. 856 (1930), aff'd, 54 F. 2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1931).
8. UNnYomR PARTNERSHIP AcT § 30.
9. 304 U.S. 271 (1938).
10. Mary D. Walsh, 7 T.C. 205 (1946).
11. Commissioner v. Mnookin's Estate, 184 F. 2d 89 (8th Cir. 1950); Girard Trust Co.
v. United States, 182 F. 2d 921 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Henderson's Estate v. Commissioner, 155
F. 2d 310 (5th Cir. 1946). Contra: Darcy v. Commissioner, 66 F. 2d 581 (2d Cir 1933).
12. Henderson's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F. 2d 310 (5th Cir. 1946) (Louisiana
statute).
13. "Moreover, consistency would seem to require that, if upon the death of a partner
a partnership year does not end for the surviving partners, where the only purpose of
continuance is to wind up the affairs of a partnership, it should not end for the deceased
partner where the partnership agreement provides, as it does in this proceeding, that
the firm itself and the interest of a deceased partner shall continue after his death."
Commissioner v. Mnookin's Estate, 12 T. C. 744, 753 (1949).
14. Robert E. Ford, 6 T. C. 499 (1946).
15. 303 U.S. 493 (1937).
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which operated on a fiscal year ending July 31, and a calendar year basis partner
who died on December 16, 1933. An accounting was made as of the date of decedent's
death covering the period from August 1, 1933 to December 16, 1933. Shortly
thereafter the executor received payment of the decedent's interest in the partnership
including his share of the partnership profits for the period covered by the accounting.
The Supreme Court held these profits were includible as income in the decedents
final return.
In the recent case of Girard Trust Co. v. United States,16 however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held an agreement to continue the
firm after the death of a partner effective for tax purposes. This case involved a
decedent on a calendar year basis and a partnership with a fiscal year ending June 30,
under an agreement whereby on the death of a partner the business was to be
continued until the close of the partnership fiscal year following. The Commissioner
sought to tax the deceased partner on his share of income for the full partnership
year ending June 30, 1942, plus his share of partnership income for the period from
the end of such partnership fiscal year until the date of his death, November 15,
1942. The Court of Appeals sustained the tax to the decedent on income from the
completed partnership year which ended within his calendar year, December 31,
1942, but held that the relevant share of the partnership income for the balance of
the year was included in the partnership year ending June 30, 1943, and was taxable
to the estate in its calendar year ending December 31, 1943. Basing its decision
upon Section 188 of the Internal Revenue Code, without referring to Section 182
of the Code, the court asserted that for the purpose of administering the income-
tax laws "Congress has not seen fit to tax partnership income as earned but rather
as if each partner's earnings occurred periodically at the end of each taxable year of
the partnership." 17 Thus the court recognized the partnership as though it were an
entity for the purpose of computing the taxable income of an enterprise upon an
annual basis "in the same manner and on the same basis as in the case of an
individual."'s
The decision in the Girard case distinguished the situation before it from that
in the Guaranty Trust case. In the Girard case the partnership agreement expressly
provided for the representative of the deceased partner to continue his interest at
risk in the business, whereas, in the Guaranty case the decedent had no continuing
interest. The court asserted, as a second distinguishing feature, that Congress has
passed Section 126 of the Internal Revenue Code since the decision in the Guaranty
case, contending that the Supreme Court in the Guaranty case was impelled to its
decision by the revenue laws as they then existed. As heretofore indicated, unless the
income was taxed to the deceased partner in his last year, it would entirely escape
taxation as income. Section 126(a)(1) of the Code now provides the procedure for
the taxation of a decedent's estate where items not includible in a final return are
subsequently received.
In the instant case the same distinctions between the Guaranty Trust case and the
principal case were recognized, but the court is not persuaded that they are sub-
stantial or controlling. The court asserts that this partnership agreement, providing
for the election by the representative of the deceased partner to continue his interest
at risk in the business, does not prevent the dissolution of the partnership at the date
of the deceased partner's death' 9 and regards Section 126(a)(1) of the Code as a
16. 182 F. 2d 921 (3d Cir. 1950).
17. 182 F. 2d 921, 924 (3d Cir. 1950).
18. ITT. Rn . CODE § 183.
19. Darcy v. Commissioner, 66 F. 2d 581 (2d Cir. 1933). The court in the Darcy casce
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mere statutory change to prevent the escape from taxation of gross income to a
decedent under other provisions of the tax laws.20
These two differences, however, appear to make the Guaranty Trust case substan-
tially and effectually distinguishable from the instant case. The Guaranty case hardly
touches the question of whether the short period from the end of the partnership's
normal taxable year to the date of the partner's death should be treated as a "taxable
year." A partnership accounting was in fact made to determine the deceased partner's
share of the partnership income up to the date of his death and the amount found
to be due on such accounting was in fact paid to his estate shortly thereafter.2 1 The
executor conceded that the partnership ended on the date of decedent's death. Under
the facts in the Guaranty case there was no issue as to when the income became
distributable. The only question the executor argued was whether, under what is now
Section 188 of the Code, more than 12 months' income could be thrown into a single
tax year. The passage of Section 126 of the Code now removes the possibility of
this income escaping fom taxation and obviates the necessity for a holding such as
that reached in the Guaranty Trust case. 2
Since the Supreme Court 23 has held that as to the surviving partners the death
of a partner does not affect the partnership taxable year, to hold otherwise as to the
deceased partner in the instant case seems unrealistic. Where the partnership
continues and the partnership agreement provides that the interest of the decedent
shall continue at the risk of the business, the relationship of the decedent and the
partnership, although somewhat altered, is not terminated. In the instant case there
was no accounting or right to accounting at the date of death and therefore no
reason to treat the taxable year of the partnership any differently in respect of the
decedent and his estate than there is in respect of the surviving partners. It would
appear, therefore, that the income in question is taxable to the decedent's estate
under Section 126(a)(1) of the Code as being "income in respect of a decedent" and
"not properly includible in respect of the taxable period in which falls the date of
his death."
interpreted New York law as requiring a finding that death caused the partnership to
cease to exist. This was despite the fact that New York had adopted the Uniform Partner-
ship Act and, as has been previously noted, under that Act death results only in dissolution
of the partnership. The true distinction is this: after dissolution the partnership ceases
to exist as a going concern; it continues to exist for purposes of liquidation.
20. E.g., INT. REV. CODE § 42(a).
21. It is interesting to note the following language used by the Supreme Court in the
Guaranty Trust case which would seem to indicate that if the surviving partners are not
bound to account to a partner on the date of his death, the income is not taxable until a
subsequent period: ". . . Since the partner is entitled to profits only upon a partnership
accounting at the end of an accounting period, his profits become subject to income tax
when and as they are thus ascertained . . . the taxable income of a partner is limited to
that share of the partnership earnings to which he becomes entitled during his taxable
year . . . ." 303 U.S. 493, 498 (1937). For a fuller discussion of this point see Note, 5
TAx L. REv. 568, 574 (1950).
22. 6 MERTmENS, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION § 35.31 (1949).
23. Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1938).
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